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Rich and Ever Richer: Differential Returns Across Socio-Economic 
Groups 
This paper estimates rates of return across the gross wealth distribution in eight 
European countries. Like differential saving rates, differential rates of return matter 
for Post Keynesian theory, because they impact the income and wealth distribution 
and add an explosive element to growth models. We show that differential rates of 
return matter empirically by merging data on household balance sheets with long-
run returns for individual asset categories. We find that (1) the composition of 
wealth differentiates between three socioeconomic groups: 30% are asset-poor, 
65% are middle-class home owners, and the top 5% are business-owning 
capitalists; (2) rates of return rise across all groups; and (3) rates of return broadly 
follow a log-shaped function across the distribution, where inequality in the lower 
half of the distribution is higher than in the upper half. If socioeconomic groups 
are collapsed into the bottom 95% workers and top 5% capitalists, then rates of 
return are 5.6% for the former and 7.2% for the latter. 
Keywords: rate of return; differential; wealth; distribution 
Subject classification codes: D31 (Personal income, wealth, and their 
distributions), D33 (Factor income distributions), E43 (Interest Rates: 
Determination, Term Structure, and Effects), E12 (General aggregative models: 
Post-Keynesian), E21 (Consumption, saving, wealth) 
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Introduction 
The distribution of wealth plays an important role in determining economic capabilities 
and in shaping the position of individuals in the socioeconomic structure. Wealth is not 
only distributed much more unequally than income, but it is also linked to political power. 
For all these reasons, Post Keynesian economics has a long tradition of investigating the 
theory of wealth inequality (Pasinetti 1962, Dutt 1990, Palley 2012). Recently, advances 
in data availability have garnered renewed interest in empirical wealth research (Piketty 
2014; Saez and Zucman 2016; Alvaredo et al. 2017). 
In conceptualizing inequality, the Post Keynesian literature traditionally 
differentiates between classes. Workers differ systematically from capitalists in their 
insertion into the economy, i.e. their options and outcomes (Wright 1997), which is 
reflected in their respective income sources. Recent Post Keynesian thought has thus paid 
detailed attention to the functional distribution of income (Bhaduri and Marglin 1990; 
Barbosa and Taylor 2006; Stockhammer and Ederer 2008; Stockhammer, Onaran, Ederer 
2009). This has shifted the focus somewhat from classes to the source of income. For 
understanding wealth inequality, however, classes or socioeconomic groups are important 
(Rehm and Schnetzer 2015; Rehm, Naqvi, Hofmann 2016; Ederer and Rehm 2019): The 
ownership of businesses conveys very different economic capabilities than, say, the 
ownership of one’s main residence. Since returns differ between wealth categories, such 
differences in ownership translate directly into differential returns on wealth for different 
socioeconomic groups. 
The Post Keynesian literature has long provided theoretical arguments for 
differential rates of return (Kahn 1959, Laing 1969, Harcourt 1972, Pasinetti 1974, 1983; 
Gupta 1977) analogous to differential saving rates. This debate revolved around the 
question whether interest rates (received by workers) are lower than profit rates (received 
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by capitalists) and already raised several key points around differential returns: First, 
differential rates of return impact the income distribution if there are mixed income 
sources, because they imply workers’ income from profits on their invested capital is 
lower than capitalists’. Second, differential rates of return may lead to positive (i.e. 
explosive) feedback effects in the distribution of wealth. Third, this then has implications 
for the stability of a growth regime. The issue of differential rates of return is thus highly 
relevant for the Post Keynesian growth literature. 
Crucially for this paper, new and improved data sources now make it possible to 
investigate the question of differential rates of return empirically. Some recent empirical 
work (Bach, Calvet, and Sodini 2018; Fagereng et al. 2018) has done so for individual 
Nordic countries, often with a limited theoretical backdrop. The aim of this paper is thus 
to situate differential returns in a modern Post Keynesian debate, and to provide an 
empirical estimate for differential rates of return for socioeconomic groups in several 
European countries. 
This paper estimates rates of return across the distribution of gross wealth in 
European countries by combining two (relatively) novel data sets. We apply rates of 
return compiled by Jordà et al. (2018) to the Household Finance and Consumption Survey 
(ECB 2014) and show that (1) the composition of wealth differentiates between three 
socioeconomic groups: the asset-poor, middle-class home owners, and capitalists; (2) 
rates of return rise over those groups in all countries; and (3) inequality is higher between 
the middle and bottom than between the top and middle of the wealth distribution. 
The structure is as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature and section 3 describes 
the data sources. Section 4 contains our results, and section 5 concludes. 
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Literature Review 
The Post Keynesian literature has long recognized that socioeconomic groups or classes 
(i.e., workers and capitalists) differ in systematic ways. One key aspect here are 
differential saving rates, i.e. that capitalists on the whole save a larger fraction of their 
income than workers. This is a well-established concept in Post Keynesian theory that 
was introduced by Keynes (1936) and formalized by Kalecki (1937), who posits a bipolar 
distribution of functional income – where workers exclusively earn wages and rentiers 
receive only profits – and in addition assumes that workers do not save. With these 
restrictive assumptions, the functional and the personal income distribution coincide. 
Kaldor (1955) relaxes the assumption that workers do not save in his well-known savings 
function, and thus moves towards a differentiation by income source. However, wage-
earners still have a lower saving rate than profit-earners, because firms retain some profits 
to reinvest. 
Pasinetti (1962), in contrast, deals with classes (workers and capitalists) and assumes 
different saving rates for each class regardless of their income sources.  Furthermore, he 
points out that workers who save and thus accumulate wealth must receive a part of profits 
as interest, even though he assumes a single rate of return for both workers and capitalists 
(Pasinetti 1962).1 In modern Post Keynesian models, a positive saving rate for workers is 
by now a standard assumption (e.g. Bhaduri and Marglin 1990). In the recent literature, 
                                                 
1. He states that "in a long-run equilibrium model, the obvious hypothesis is that of a rate of 
interest equal to the rate of profits" (Pasinetti, 1962, pp. 271-272). Samuelson and 
Modigliani (1966) point out that while it is necessary to make this assumption explicit in 
Pasinetti's framework, it is not relevant in Kaldor's framework, given that the latter 
distinguishes between income groups. 
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a number of works have built on Pasinetti in incorporating an endogenous wealth 
distribution in Post Keynesian frameworks (Palley 2012, 2017; Taylor et al. 2015; Ederer 
and Rehm 2019), in which the wealth share of workers and capitalists depend inter alia 
on their saving rates. If there are differential rates of return, then the question whether to 
focus on the functional or personal income distribution is important, because profit 
incomes (which are determined by the functional income distribution) differ by classes 
(i.e., the personal income distribution). That is, differential returns directly impact the 
income distribution. 
A rich Post Keynesian debate has examined the implications for Post Keynesian 
theory if the interest rate received by workers is lower than the rate of profit received by 
capitalists. First suggested by Kahn (1959) and picked up by Laing (1969), early 
contributions to the literature on differential rates of return were among others Balestra 
and Baranzini (1971), Harcourt (1972), Maneschi (1974), Moore (1974), Gupta (1977), 
Fazi and Salvadori (1981), and especially Pasinetti’s seminal work (1974, 1983).2 This 
literature revolved around the recognition that an interest rate lower than (capitalists’ or 
the average) profit rate lends further support to a Pasinetti-like stable wealth distribution.3 
Differential returns however add an explosive element to the dynamic of wealth 
inequality, and thus have implications for the stability of growth. They raise the likelihood 
of landing in an 'anti-dual equilibrium' (Darity 1981), in which capitalists own all the 
wealth. 
                                                 
2. For a comprehensive overview of this theoretical literature, see Baranzini and 
Mirante (2013). 
3. As opposed to the 'dual equilibrium' by Samuelson and Modigliani (1966), in which 
capitalists cease to exist and are replaced by workers, who own all wealth. 
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Furthermore, differentiating between the rates of return for workers and capitalists 
also opens up possibilities to include different assets and a different portfolio composition 
for the two classes (Kurz and Salvadori 2010). In particular, it permits including a 
monetary asset (Ramanathan 1976), and thus brings “money back into Cambridge 
macroeconomics” (Kregel 1985). Distinguishing between different (monetary and non-
monetary) assets is now standard in portfolio choice theory (Brainard and Tobin 1968, 
Tobin 1969) and in Post Keynesian stock-flow-consistent modelling (Godley and Lavoie 
2007).  
Conceptually, differential rates of return thus have a similar effect on the 
distribution of income between classes and on the distribution of wealth as different 
saving rates. As Pasinetti (1974: 141) puts it: “… a rate of interest lower than the rate of 
profit has the same effect as a higher propensity to save of the capitalists”. This aspect 
was stressed more recently by Piketty (2014, 430f), who is concerned with the scale 
effects or increasing returns of wealth that may contribute to rising wealth inequality: 
Already large estates accumulate at a much faster pace than smaller wealth holdings, as 
the former receive relatively higher returns (Piketty 2014), which in turn makes them 
larger, leading to higher returns and so on. This cumulative causation (Myrdal, 1957) is 
self-reinforcing and leads to an explosive pattern unless macroeconomic constraints, e.g. 
through feedback effects of wealth inequality on aggregate demand, stabilize the wealth 
distribution (Ederer and Rehm 2018). 
Three recent empirical studies find differential rates of return, two of them using 
administrative data in Nordic countries. Bach, Calvet, and Sodini (2018) estimate from 
an administrative panel of Swedish residents that returns on gross wealth are on average 
roughly 2 percentage points higher for households in the top 5% of the wealth distribution 
compared to the median. Fagereng et al. (2018) document differential returns on net 
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wealth using Norwegian administrative tax records. Moving from the 5th to the 95th 
percentile of the wealth distribution increases the median return by about 4.5 percentage 
points, from -0.15% to more than 4%. Furthermore, using survey data for the US, Kuhn, 
Schularick, and Steins (2017) show that income data does not fully explain changes in 
the wealth distribution, and conclude that asset prices must therefore also play a role. 
They estimate changes in wealth shares resulting from systematic differences in the 
portfolio composition of the bottom 25%, the next 65% and the top 10% of households, 
which they characterize as a ‘race’ between house prices and stock values. 
One important channel giving rise to differential rates of return is thus households’ 
balance sheets. There is ample evidence that the type of assets owned differs 
systematically along the wealth distribution: Wealthy households typically hold a larger 
fraction of their wealth in equity such as businesses or stocks; the (upper) middle class 
owns real estate, mostly their primary residence; and poorer households’ portfolios 
comprise mostly deposits and saving accounts (Rehm and Schnetzer 2015, Kuhn, 
Schularick, Steins 2017).  
While there are several potential channels through which differential rates of 
return may arise, such as ability, professional portfolio management, or networks (Piketty 
2014, 447f), the recent empirical literature provides extensive evidence regarding the 
household balance sheet channel on differential returns. In fact, all three papers cited 
above confirm this channel for Sweden (Bach, Calvet, and Sodini 2018), Norway 
(Fagereng et al. 2018) and the U.S. (Kuhn, Schularick, and Steins 2017).  
This paper builds on and expands the existing literature on the empirical evidence 
of differential returns, which the Post Keynesian literature has shown to be highly relevant 
for theoretical questions of distribution and growth. It combines a novel data set on 
historic rates of return by Jordà et al. (2018) with asset class data from the Household 
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Finance and Consumption Survey (ECB 2014) to estimate total real rates of return along 
the distribution of wealth for eight European countries. 
Data 
To construct differential returns along the wealth distribution, we combine data from the 
second wave of the Household Finance and Consumption Survey 2014 (HFCS, ECB 
2014) on households’ balance sheets with a data set by Jordà et al. (2018) that contains 
information on rates of return for broad asset classes. The HFCS collects ex-ante 
harmonized micro-level data on detailed real and financial asset categories in 20 
European countries, and covers a total of 84,000 households. The data are multiply 
imputed, which we take into account in our reported estimates by using Rubin’s Rule.  
We use real rates of return from the data set of Jordà et al. (2018) (henceforth, 
JKKST) for bonds, housing, and equity. The data cover 16 advanced economies, of which 
8 overlap with the HFCS.4 In order to capture long-run returns, we use the average 
between 1980 and 2015. Rates of return on bonds are measured in the JKKST data as the 
total return on long-term government bonds listed and traded on local exchange markets 
with a targeted maturity of around 10 years. Rates of return on equity comprise indices 
weighted by market capitalization of individual stocks and a selection of stocks 
representative for the stock market. Finally, rates of return on housing are obtained by 
combining the house price series from Knoll, Schularick, Steger (2017) with data on rents 
from Knoll (2016) using the rent-price approach.  
  
                                                 
4. These are Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. 
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Table 1. Crosswalk of asset categories between HFCS and JKKST 
Asset in the HFCS  Variable  Asset Categories in JKKST 
    Bonds  Business Wealth  Housing  Other 
Real Assets           
Main Residence  DA1110      x   
Other Real Estate for Business 
Activity  DA1121    x     
Other Real Estate not for 
Business Activity  DA1122      x   
Vehicles  DA1130        x 
Valuables  DA1131        x 
Financial Assets           
Self‐Employment Business  DA1140    x     
Deposits  DA2101        x 
Mutual Funds  DA2102    x     
Bonds  DA2103  x       
Non Self‐Employment Business  DA2104    x     
Shares  DA2105    x     
Managed Accounts  DA2106    x     
Money Owed to the Household  DA2107        x 
Other Fin. Assets (e.g. 
Derivatives)  DA2108    x     
Voluntary Pensions/Life 
Insurances  DA2109  x       
Note: This table shows the allocation of assets categories in the HFCS to those in Jordà 
et al. (2018). 
Source: ECB 2014, Jordà et al. 2018 (data); own elaboration 
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Table 1 shows the crosswalk between the HFCS and JKKST asset categories. It 
does not contain JKKST’s asset category ‘Bills’, because the HFCS does not provide 
sufficiently detailed information on bond ownership by issuer. Furthermore, we add the 
category ‘Other’ for minimal-yield assets, such as vehicles, valuables, deposits and 
money owed to the household by others. We follow Bach, Calvet, Sodini (2018) in 
assuming that this asset category does not yield returns.5 
Table 2. Total wealth by asset category and net sample size 
Country Bonds Housing  Business Wealth Other Net sample size 
Belgium 75 1,143  311 230 2,238 
Finland 9 449  88 77 11,030 
France 620 4,882  1,347 1,178 12,035 
Germany 592 5,574  1,768 1,456 4,461 
Italy 184 4,258  733 566 8,156 
Netherlands 194 1,205  96 262 1,284 
Portugal 12 480  125 101 6,207 
Spain 155 3,772  774 559 6,106 
 
Note: Total assets in the categories Bonds, Housing, Business Wealth and Other are in 
billions of Euro. 
Source: ECB 2014 (data); own elaboration 
 
Table 2 shows total wealth in the resulting asset categories by country, as well as 
the number of observations in our sample.6 Table 3 depicts real rates of return for each 
corresponding asset category from JKKST. 
                                                 
5. More precisely, Bach, Calvet, Salvini (2018) assume no excess return over the risk-free 
interest rate for deposit-like wealth. The risk-free interest rate on 10-year government 
bonds has hovered near zero in several European countries.  
6. Negative values are excluded. 
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Table 3. Average annual real rates of return, 1980-2015 
Country Bonds Housing Equity 
Belgium 6.24 7.20 11.49 
Finland 5.76 9.47 16.17 
France 6.94 6.39 11.07 
Germany 4.22 4.12 10.06 
Italy 5.85 4.57  9.45 
Netherlands 5.59 6.41 11.90 
Portugal 6.25 7.15  8.34 
Spain 5.72 4.62 11.00 
 
Note: Rates of return are pre-tax and measure the income per unit of capital. 
Source: Jordà et al. 2018  
 
Results 
Figure 1 shows the relative distribution7 of households’ asset categories across 
unconditional gross wealth vingtiles. The composition changes from ‘other’ wealth being 
the dominant asset category at the bottom of the wealth distribution, to housing in the 
(upper) middle, and to business wealth increasing in importance at the top of the wealth 
distribution. On (unweighted) average over all countries, housing supersedes the no-yield 
asset category ‘Other’ in the 6th vingtile in making up more than 50% of households’ 
balance sheets. At the other end of the unconditional wealth distribution, business wealth 
gains importance above 25% of households’ assets only in the top vingtile, i.e. the top 
5% of households by wealth. These indicators can thus be used to divide the population 
into three groups with corresponding ownership patterns of wealth categories: the first, 
asset-poor group comprises on average the bottom 30% of the population, the second, 
                                                 
7. For the distribution of absolute values of household asset categories across unconditional 
gross wealth vingtiles, see Figure 1A in the Appendix. 
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home-owners, the middle 65%, and the third, business owners, the top 5%. We thus find 
substantial differences in the composition of assets between socio-economic groups.  
 
Combining these asset compositions with the rates of return of JKKST, we find 
that the rates of return rise across the wealth distribution, as Figure 2 shows. They are 
near zero for the bottom 5% in all countries except Finland (where they start above 1%) 
and remain well below 2% for the bottom 20% in all countries except Portugal. Rates of 
return then rise steeply and plateau for the upper half of the wealth distribution until the 
top 5% in most cases. The resulting pattern is roughly one of a log function for the bottom 
95% of the wealth distribution with an inflection point between the 2nd and 8th gross 
wealth vingtile. Only Germany shows a more linear gradient in the bottom half of its 
wealth distribution. Rates of return then rise steeply for the top 5% in most countries; the 
exceptions are the Netherlands and Portugal. 
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Figure 1. Asset composition by gross household wealth vingtiles 
 
Source: ECB 2014 (data); own elaboration 
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Figure 2. Rates of return by country across gross wealth vingtiles 
Note: Countries are sorted by their rate of return level in the 20th vingtile.  
Source: ECB 2014, Jordà et al. 2018 (data); own elaboration 
 
Whereas the pattern thus shows some striking similarities across countries, levels 
differ. The “plateau” lies between roughly 3.5% annual real rate of return in Germany 
and about 8.5% in Finland at the other extreme. Real rates of return stabilize between 4 
and 4.5% in Italy and Spain, and between 5.5% and 6.5% in Belgium, France, the 
Netherlands, and Portugal. 
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Table 4. Average annual real rates of return for three household groups  
Country Asset-Poor 
Home-
owning 
Middle 
Class 
Workers 
(bottom 95 
%) 
Business-
owning 
Top 5% 
  (1)  (2)  (1+2)  (3) 
Belgium 2.6 6.6 6.5 8.3 
Finland 3.4 8.7 8.6 10.8 
France 2.6 5.7 5.6 7.6 
Germany 2.1 3.7 3.6 5.9 
Italy 2.4 4.5 4.4 5.7 
Netherlands 3.2 5.7 5.5 6.1 
Portugal 2.0 6.1 6.1 6.9 
Spain 0.9 4.5 4.5 6.5 
Average 2.4 5.7 5.6 7.2 
 
Note: ‘Asset-Poor’ in column (1) captures all gross wealth household vingtiles at the 
bottom of the gross wealth distribution owning on average less than 50% of their gross 
wealth in their main residence (30% of all households). ‘Home-owning Middle Class’ in 
column (2) covers households with more than 50% of their gross wealth invested in their 
main residence, and less than 25% of their gross wealth in business wealth, on average 
(65% of all households). ‘Workers’ are column (1) and (2) combined and make up the 
bottom 95% of all households. ‘Business-owning Top 5%’ in column (3) are households 
in the top vingtile, owning on average more than 25% of their gross wealth in business 
wealth (except in the Netherlands). The average in the last row is an unweighted mean 
across countries. 
 
Source: ECB 2014, Jordà et al. 2018 (data); own elaboration 
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Table 4 combines our findings from the two data sources into our main result. It 
shows unweighted average real annual rates of return for the asset-poor, the home-owning 
middle class, and the business-owning top 5%. These amount to 2.4%, 5.7%, and 7.2%, 
respectively. The top 5% thus earn returns that are more than 2.5 times higher than those 
at the bottom. Over 50 years on an initial investment of 10,000 Euro, this amounts to a 
difference of about 290.000 Euro. Since the Post Keynesian literature typically refers to 
just two groups, workers and capitalists, collapsing the former two into a (very broad) 
workers’ group yields an average rate of return of 5.6% for workers and 7.2% for 
capitalists. 
Table 5. Differences in rates of return between selected vingtiles of the gross wealth 
distribution 
Country v20–v10 v10–v1 v20-v1 v19–v2 
Belgium 1.7 6.4 8.1 7.1 
Finland 2.3 7.2 9.5 8.6 
France 2.3 5.3 7.6 5.9 
Germany 3.1 2.8 5.9 3.7 
Italy 1.5 4.1 5.6 4.8 
Netherlands 0.1 5.7 5.9 5.7 
Portugal 0.8 6.1 6.9 6.1 
Spain 2.2 4.2 6.4 3.9 
Average 1.8 5.2 7.0 5.7 
Note: This table shows absolute differences between average rates of return of gross 
wealth vingtiles. The average in the last row is an unweighted mean across countries. 
Source: ECB 2014, Jordà et al. 2018 (data); own elaboration 
 
Finally, Table 5 presents selected distributional indicators in order to take another 
look at the question where in the distribution inequality in returns stems from. Taking the 
difference between the rate of return of the top vingtile and the median (v20-v10) yields 
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0.1 in the Netherlands and 0.8 in Portugal with their broadly stable rates of return in the 
top half of the wealth distribution. For the other countries, the difference lies between 1.5 
(in Italy) and 2.3 (in Finland and France). We therefore find somewhat limited differences 
in returns between the middle and the top of the distribution. 
In contrast, inequality in rates of return is much starker in the bottom half of the 
distribution. The difference in rates of return received by the median and the bottom 
vingtile is between 2.8 (in Germany with its almost linearly rising rates of return) and 7.2 
(in Finland). That is, on (unweighted) average, European households in the top 5% of the 
wealth distribution receive an annual real rate of return that is almost 7 percentage points 
higher than for households in the bottom 30%, whereas the difference between the median 
and the top is roughly 1.75 percentage points. Table 4 also shows that because of the 
upward tick of rates of return in the top 5%, using deciles underestimates the differential 
nature of rates of return in all cases except the Netherlands.8 
To sum up, we find that asset composition differs substantially across three socio-
economic groups, the asset-poor, the home-owning middle class, and the business-
owning top 5%. These groups are faced with differentials in rates of return that are 
economically significant, rising from 2.4% to 5.7% and 7.2%, respectively. Roughly 
categorized in Post Keynesian terms as ‘workers’ and ‘capitalists’, the differentials in 
rates of return amount to 5.6% and 7.2%. Finally, across the gross wealth distribution 
rates of return can be approximated by a broadly log-shaped function, with the inflection 
point lying between the 2nd and 8th vingtile. That is, inequality between the bottom and 
                                                 
8. The uptick in the 10th decile in the Netherlands is due to one household with very high 
business assets. However, we chose not to deleted single observations from our data. 
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the middle in rates of return is much larger than that between the middle and the top of 
the gross wealth distribution.  
Our results are in line with the (limited) existing literature, not just regarding 
patterns but also with regard to magnitudes. As discussed, Bach, Calvet and Sodini (2018) 
estimate a differential of 1.99 percentage points between the median and the top 5% of 
gross wealth, which is almost exactly equal to our result of roughly 2 percentage points. 
Fagereng et al. (2018, Figure 4A) find a roughly log-shaped function of differential 
returns from the 20th percentile; their data is noisy below that level since they use net 
wealth. For this reason, their average rates of return are markedly negative at the bottom 
of the distribution, but the differential between their rates of return between the median 
and the top 5% amounts to roughly 1.4 percentage points, which is not very far from our 
1.75 percentage points.  
It should, however, be noted that our findings, while compatible with the existing 
literature, need to be interpreted cautiously. First, it is highly likely that we underestimate 
the differentials in rates of return due to the notorious under-coverage of high-wealth 
households (which can only be partially redressed by the oversampling of the HFCS), 
combined with the highly right-skewed distribution of wealth documented in Figure 1A 
in the Appendix. Second, our data is only able to capture one of several potential channels 
for differential rates of return, namely household balance sheet composition across the 
distribution. Taking other channels into account9 is likely to lead to results finding higher 
differentials in rates of return. Third, our data does not permit us to capture capital gains, 
which likely play an important and differential role in wealth accumulation across the 
                                                 
9. Or, ideally, using observed rates of return, which our data quality unfortunately does not 
permit. 
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wealth distribution (Taylor et al. 2015). Wealthy households are likely to benefit more 
from higher capital gains, which again renders our estimates conservative. 
Conclusion 
This paper estimates rates of return across the distribution of gross wealth in European 
countries. We find that that three socioeconomic groups are marked by differential rates 
of return analogous to differential saving rates. This underscores the theoretical 
considerations of the Post Keynesian literature since the 1950’s on differential rates of 
return. 
Concretely, we merge annual real rates of return compiled by Jordà et al. (2018) 
with the detailed asset categories at the household level provided in the Household 
Finance and Consumption Survey (ECB 2014) for eight European countries. That is, we 
apply the rates of return for low-yield assets (deposit and saving accounts, vehicles etc.), 
housing (i.e., the primary residence), bonds (including voluntary pension plans), and 
equity (business wealth both in stocks and in direct stakes) to the wealth held by 
households at the micro level. 
Our findings are three-fold: First, the composition of wealth differs substantially 
between three socioeconomic groups. These are the asset-poor, who own mostly low-
yield assets and comprise roughly 30% of the population on average; middle-class home 
owners, who make up most of the upper half of the population and whose household 
balance sheet is dominated by the main residence; and capitalists, who own economically 
significant amounts of business wealth and make up roughly the top 5% of the population. 
Second, we find differential rates of return across the wealth distribution. Rates 
of return rise largely monotonously over the entire population, and there are clear 
differences in average rates of return for the three socioeconomic groups. The asset-poor 
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receive a rate of return of about 2.4% on their wealth, the home owning middle and upper 
class receives roughly 5.7%, and capitalists about 7.2%. If these are collapsed into the 
standard groups of workers and capitalists, then this averages out to about 5.6% for the 
former and 7.2% for the latter. The magnitude of our findings is in line with the (limited) 
existing literature on differential rates of return.  
Third, rates of return across the wealth distribution roughly approximate log 
functions for the bottom 95% in most countries. That is, they rise steeply to a broad 
“plateau”, and then only tick upwards again at the very top of the wealth distribution. 
This implies that inequality is substantially higher between the middle and bottom than 
between the top and middle of the wealth distribution.  
Naturally, many important research questions remain unanswered. First and 
foremost, higher-quality data from administrative sources might yield additional insights 
into the distribution of rates of return, especially at the very top of the distribution. 
Second, capital gains play an important role in wealth accumulation and merit closer 
attention since it is likely that they are unevenly distributed, but our data does not permit 
us to study their dynamics. Third, it would be very interesting to investigate other 
potential channels for differential returns, such as differences in innate ability, in 
professionalism in investment management, in access to insider information, or in 
political clout. 
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Appendix 
Figure 1A. Absolute levels of asset categories by gross household wealth vingtiles 
 
Source: ECB 2014 (data); own elaboration 
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Table 1A. Cut-off vingtiles between the asset-poor and the home-owning middle class 
by country 
 
Threshold 
vingtile Belgium  Finland France Germany Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain Average 
Asset‐
poor (1)  5  6 8 10 6 8 4 2 6 
Middle 
class (2)  19  19  19  19  19  n.a.  19  19  19 
 
Note: The threshold denotes (1) the vingtile demarcating the asset-poor from the home-
owning middle class, i.e. the point in the gross wealth distribution where housing wealth 
still makes up less than 50% of households’ wealth, and (2) the vingtile demarcating the 
home-owning middle class from the business-owning top 5%, i.e. the point in the gross 
wealth distribution where business wealth still makes up less than 25% of households’ 
wealth. The average in the last column is an unweighted mean across countries. 
Source: ECB 2014 (data); own elaboration 
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